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The Use of Tests in Promotions Under
Seniority Provisions
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance of seniority provisions in collective bargaining
agreements arises from the effect of seniority clauses upon promotions,
transfers, layoffs, and recalls. Because these provisions invade the
field of management prerogatives, utilization of the principle of
seniority has traditionally been strongly resisted by employers. However, the mass layoffs caused by the depression of the thirties and at
the end of World War II led to irresistible pressure by unions for
job security through recognition of seniority rights.1 While the early
importance of seniority was primarily in determining the order of
layoffs,2 the role of seniority in promotions is of greater concern in
today's full employment economy. One of the principal arguments for
the use of seniority is that it is an objective means of determining who
receives the promotion when a job opening occurs. In most contracts,
however, in recognition of management's right to an efficient and
productive operation, seniority is tempered by some consideration of
employee ability, particularly in the matter of promotions. Obviously,
the subjective nature of such a determination gives rise to disagreements as to whether management's determination of ability was correct
and in accordance with the terms of the contract. In order to make
the evaluation of ability less subjective, and thus less subject to union
challenge, management has turned increasingly to the use of various
tests. This note deals primarily with the role of such tests in promotion disputes under seniority clauses.
While factual distinctions and differences in contract provisions
limit the value of prior arbitration awards as precedents, certain principles and methods of approach have evolved to guide the parties
concerned. 3 Although arbitrators are not obligated to follow these
principles,4 a study of awards reveals a rather clearly defined body
of law with respect to tests.5 Until recently, the only "law" regulating
the use of tests was that enunciated by the arbitrators. However,
Title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that ".... [iut shall not
1. C. BANDLE & M. WoRTmAN, COLLECTIVE BARGANING 484 (2d ed. 1966) (hereinafter cited as RAmLE. & WORTmAN]; McCaffrey, Development and Administration of

Seniority Provisions, N.Y.U. 2D ANN. CoNr. ON LABRor 131 (1949).
2. Mitchem, Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 21 RocKY MT.
L. REV. 156, 158 (1949).

3. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAnv. L. REv.
999, 1020 (1955).
4. Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46, 48 (1959) (Warns).
5. That prior, well-reasoned awards are given great respect, see North Shore Gas.

Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 37, 42 (1963) (Sembower).
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be... an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test
provided that such test, its administration, or action upon the results
is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."6 Guidelines defining a "professionally developed ability test" have been enunciated,7 and at
least one Equal Employment Opportunity Commission decision has
held that an employer did not prove that the tests he used for
promotion purposes were properly related to the jobs in issue or
properly validated.8 Undoubtedly, the interpretations of and decisions
under this section of the Act will eliminate the use of tests for
discriminatory purposes. But the indirect effect of these decisions may
be even greater as unions will press for the incorporation of these
principles on proper testing procedures into labor contracts in order
to protect all employees. Decisions under the testing provision of the
Civil Rights Act will be of assistance to unions in the present trend
toward attacks upon the validity of tests employed, rather than upon
the right of management to use tests at all.9
II. SENIOR=Y

A. Seniority Defined and Interests Involved
To appreciate fully the problems involved in the use of tests to
determine ability under seniority clauses, one must understand seniority itself, as well as the basic differences between types of seniority
provisions, which by their inherent ambiguities demand objective
criteria such as tests. Seniority has been defined as the employee's
"length of service for the particular employer in the particular . . .
unit of that employer."' 0 It is the employee's status in relation to other
employees which thereby establishes certain preferences for him in
instances of layoff and promotion." Because of these preferences or
rights, seniority has been described as the "working man's . . . most
cherished possession."12 Seniority is a manifestation of the employee's
search for job security, and is based on the premise that the longer
an employee has been with the company, the more he has contributed
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
7. CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, ff 16,904 (1966).
8. Id. at ff 17,304.53.
9. See Metzler & Kohrs, Tests and "The Requirements of the Job," 20 ARB. J. (n.s.)
103 (1965).
10. Shulman, supranote 3, at 1005.
11. Dep't of Labor, Labor Information Bull. 6 (Feb. 1950), quoted in RANDLE &
WORTMAN 487.
12. IAM Flash (Baltimore), March 11, 1946 at 1, quoted in RANDLE & WORTmAN
487.
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to its success; therefore, he is entitled to the jobs and promotions
13
available.
In addition to their concern with seniority as the representatives of
employees, unions have a vital interest in the concept because the
psychological appeal derived from its objectivity makes seniority an
important tool in organizational campaigns. 14 On the other hand, since
management is primarily interested in an employee's efficiency and
productivity, it would prefer that seniority not be relevant, and
definitely not controlling, in determining promotions. These competing interests, plus the fact that younger workers' interests are in
conflict with those of older workers, necessarily produce dilemmas
which must be resolved in order for the parties to agree on seniority
5
provisions.1
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Seniority
Two commentators in the field have recently compiled the following
arguments as those most frequently used in negotiating seniority.' 6
While, admittedly, several are more emotional than logical, they
are the ones commonly heard. Furthermore, it will be noticed that
the arguments are in terms of a strict seniority clause vis-h-vis no
consideration of seniority, when in practice most contracts contain
modified seniority clauses. 17 No attempt is made to evaluate them, as
their validity or fallaciousness is in most instances obvious.
Advantages
(1) Seniority improves worker morale because the worker feels
secure; indirectly this will result in increased efficiency.
13. See N. CmimErLzAN & J. KuHN, COLLeCTVE BARGnAnIN 96 (2d ed. 1965).
14. "The promise of job 'ownership' through seniority . . . has probably persuaded
more American workers to join unions than any other single element .... " Knowlton,
Recent Problems in Arbitration of Seniority Disputes, 9 Ann. J. (n.s.) 194 (1954).
15. Arbitrator Walter Gellhorn has analyzed the problem and reached the following
conclusion: "To be sure, the full utilization of seniors cannot be achieved without costs.
When seniors 'get the breaks,' the more ambitious and capable of the junior men may
feel frustrated. Moreover, a management that likes to see a clear line of promotability
from within the work force does not welcome the inflexibility that sometimes comes
from giving preference to older, perhaps less adaptable workers. But these costs were
measured when the contract was made. The parties presumably concluded that the
price was worth paying. From the standpoint of the men, they must have concluded
that the deferment of youthful hope was offset by the assurance of fair opportunity
for veteran employees. From the standpoint of management, they must have concluded
that an occasional personal rigidity was offset by the enhanced loyalty and stability
that are encouraged by an effective seniority clause." Universal Atlas Cement Co., 17
Lab. Arb. 755, 757 (1951), quoted in F. Enxoum & E. ELxourm, How AIu3mITIIATON
Wonxs 374 (rev. ed. 1960).
16. RANDLE & WoRTmAN 488-92.

17. See Part III infra.
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(2) Seniority results in a decrease of labor turnover because a
worker who has accumulated seniority does not want to sacrifice
it by quitting.

(3) Seniority's objectivity reduces grievances over promotions.
(4) In many instances, seniority is as accurate a yardstick of
ability as employer judgment. 18
(5) Seniority encourages employees to learn as much as possible
on their jobs, since they know they will advance to more difficult
positions.
(6) Seniority prevents an excessive work pace by elimination of
rivalry among workers.
(7) Both to the workers and to society, in the long run, job
security is more important than efficiency.
(8) Long-service employees have greater family responsibilities
and should therefore be given preference.
Disadvantages
(1) Seniority is an unwarranted interference with the prerogatives of management.
(2) Seniority exploits the more efficient employee and kills
his productive impulse, since the same rewards go to the less
efficient worker.
(3) Basing advancement on length of service drives the ambitious
young employee to seek employment elsewhere, leaving behind
an older, less efficient work force.
(4) While personnel management must be flexible to meet the
demands of modem production, seniority imposes a rigid,
mechanistic system.
(5) Seniority over-values experience, because there is not necessarily a positive correlation between experience and ability.
(6) Seniority does not eliminate discrimination, but merely
establishes a different basis.
(7) Disputes over the application of seniority provisions are
among the most frequent causes of grievances. 19
18. James J. Healy followed up 58 arbitration awards in which the arbitrator had
set aside management's promotion of a junior employee on the basis of superior ability.
Of the 46 responses, 29 said the senior proved himself on the new job immediately or
within a very short period. Sixteen of this 29 had since advanced even higher. In only
10 of the 46 did the company still feel the arbitrator's decision was wrong. Promotions:
A New Slant, Bus=ass Wmm, Feb. 19, 1955, at 174-75.
19. For further discussion of the attitudes toward seniority, see N. CAmuELMN,
LABoR 263-69 (1958).
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III. CMTERA FOR PROMOTIONS

A. Introduction
The vast majority of grievances over promotions involve the issue
of whether management has properly applied the clauses dealing
with the criteria for making promotions. There are two basic types
of "seniority provisions" 2°-strict seniority clauses, under which the
exclusive criterion is length of service, and modified seniority clauses,
which permit to varying degrees consideration of "fitness and ability."
Although some contracts do contain strict seniority clauses,2 1 the great
majority, while serving the basic aims of seniority, recognize more
fully the need for ensuring employee capability. The modified seniority provisions can be further broken down into three categories:
relative ability, sufficient ability, and hybrid.22 It is the function of
these seniority provisions to establish and rank the factors which the
employer may consider in the selection process. Typically, these
clauses govern both promotion and layoff, 3 but there may be different
clauses for each, 24 or even separate promotion clauses for differently
rated jobs.2
B. "Relative Ability" Clauses
"Seniority shall govern where ability and physical fitness are relatively equal."26 This clause, or one of its many variations, is preferred
by management because, theoretically 27 it permits the selection of the

"best" man for the job. Clearly, under this clause management may
20. This term is typically used to describe the clauses dealing with the criteria for
promotions.
21. E.g., Agreement between Dravo Corp., Union Barge Line, and Marine Engineers,
quoted in BNA, CBNC, at 68:62; Dana Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 203 (1956) (Mittenthal).
22. Although there are numerous names used for these various types of clauses, this
writer has chosen those used in the most influential work in this area. F. ELrxoun & E.
E.xoumr, How AmBrrRAToN WonKs (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as ELzousu].
23. The argument has been made that, while a relative ability clause may be appropriate with respect to promotions, strict seniority should govern layoffs because: (1) this
is in line with the views of employees on the matter, see Selznick & Vollmer, Rule of
Law in Industry: Security Rights, 1 IND. REL., No. 3, at 97 (1962); and (2) older
workers should receive maximum protection against layoffs because of their greater
family responsibilities and their greater difficulty in securing and adapting to new jobs.
There are two basic arguments for applying some criterion which takes ability into consideration for layoffs. First, when the test is not the same, employees desirous only of
holding a job perform at a minimum level. Fairweather, Seniority Provisions in Labor
Contracts: Social and Economic Consequences, 1 DE PAuL L. R0V. 191, 199 (1952).
Second, it is during the stresses and strains of periods of layoff that the need for
efficiency to meet competition is of maximum importance. Howard, The Interpretation
of Ability by Labor-Management Arbitrators, 14 Aima. J. (n.s.) 117, 127 (1959).
24. E.g., Advanced Structures, 37 Lab. Arb. 49 (1961) (Roberts).
25. E.g., General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213 (1959) (Thompson).
26. Lukens Steel Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1005, 1006 (1966) (Rock).
27. See notes 41 & 42 infra and accompanying text.
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compare the capabilities of the several applicants with respect to all
the qualities which relate to their capacity to perform the open
position.2 The fact that the senior is fully qualified and possesses the

ability to perform the work in a satisfactory manner is not sufficient

to upset management's decision.29 But if the evidence establishes that

the senior has approximately equal ability, he is entitled to the vacancy
since under these circumstances, seniority becomes controlling. 30

Whether these clauses are phrased "approximately equal,"3 ' "relatively equal,"32 "reasonably equal," "substantially equal,"34 or just
"equal,"3s they are interpreted the same. The problems arise from the
fact that since all of these terms are inherently ambiguous, the arbitrator must proceed to define them. Thus, in one case where the contract

read "relatively equal," the arbitrator elaborated by saying that "where
a fair and objective appraisal establishes that the qualifications of a
junior candidate ... are significantly, measurably and demonstrably
superior, the senior applicant cannot be said to have 'relatively equar"
qualifications."3 6 Another arbitrator in construing a "relatively equal"
clause said "seniority shall apply unless compelling, manifest inequality of ability requires otherwise."7
Even after completion of this circuitous defining process, whether

or not the evidence shows one employee to be "relatively equal," or
"significantly, measurably and demonstrably superior" to another, is
largely a personal, subjective judgment. The evidence considered in
28. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 263, 265 (1966) (Volz); American Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856, 860 (1963) (DiLeone).
29. Bristol Steel & Iron Works Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 263, 264 (1966) (Volz); International Nickel Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 343, 348 (1960) (Teple).
30. Monsanto Research Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 735, 739 (1962) (Dworkin).
31. Id.; General Box Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 866, 867 (1960) (Caraway).
32. Lukens Steel Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1005 (1966) (Rock); Dayton Steel Foundry Co.,
38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley).
33. Advanced Structures, 37 Lab. Arb.49 (1961) (Roberts).
34. Semling-Menke Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 523 (1966) (Graff).
35. Scott Paper Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 552 (1966) (Wolff); North Shore Gas Co., 40
Lab. Arb. 37, 40 (1963) (Sembower).
36. Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217, 221 (1966) (Dworkin)
(emphasis added).
37. Verona-Pharma Chem. Corp., 64-3 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards f[9,203, at 7,176
(1964) (Rubin) (emphasis added). The futility of attempting to define one of these
terms is illustrated by the following discussion in which the arbitrator uses three of the
above terms to define the one in issue: "'Relatively equal' means equal in comparison
with others ....It does not, however, mean absolute equality .... Where a comparison
is involved, and the things to be compared are not identical, obviously a precise
measurement cannot be made. As a practical matter, substantial equality would
suffice, and if the qualifications seemed reasonably comparable, it would normally be held
that the senior man would prevail." International Nickel Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 343, 348
(1960) (Teple) (emphasis added). Such an interpretation as this appears to negate
completely the suggestion that "substantially equal" is more precise than "relatively
equal." Note, The Seniority Clause and Managements Right to Evaluate Ability, 38
VA. L. REv. 655, 657 (1952).
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this determination are those factors bearing on "fitness and ability."
Since these terms are also vague, the parties on occasion attempt to
define more explicitly their meaning of these concepts. For example,
one clause read "[sleniority dates shall govern in cases of promotions
where physical fitness, knowledge, training, skill and efficiency are
relatively equal between employees." 38 This adds nothing because
such clauses are seemingly interpreted in the same manner as a simple
"fitness and ability" clause.39 The explanation for this is that management is permitted to consider all appropriate and relevant factors
which bear upon the employee's qualifications for the job.40 It would
seem, therefore, that the parties should specifically exclude from the
contract any factors they do not want considered.
Although a "fitness and ability" clause is the strongest from the
standpoint of management, 41 the above discussion illustrates the
Pandora's box which is opened when one attempts to compare employees, conceivably using over a dozen factors, under the guidance
of clauses using vague, general words. Because of this uncertainty,
management frequently promotes the senior employee even though
there is serious doubt as to whether he is "relatively equal."42 The
need for objective, demonstrable evidence of differences in employees'
abilities is therefore obvious; and in the past ten years, management
has increasingly turned to the use of tests.
C. "Sufficient Ability" Clauses
"When ability to do the work and qualifications of the job are determined... as being sufficient, seniority will prevail."43 "When two
or more eligible employees bid on a posted job, the job will be granted
to the employee with the greater seniority, provided he is qualified."44
"The employee with the most seniority ...shall be awarded the position bid on, providing he is capable of doing the work."45 All three
38. Class Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217, 218 (1966) (Dworkin).
39. For a similar example, see S. SL1cHTER,
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT

J. HEALY & E. LrvErNASH, TIE ImpACT

199-200 (1960).

40. John Deere Tractor Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 790, 792 (1951)

(Levinson).

The weigh-

iug process is further complicated, since several of these factors are incapable of exact
measurement and the weight each should be given in a particular case is open to
dispute. The factors include: test results, experience, trial period performance, supervisors' opinions, merit rating plans, education, production records, attendance record,
disciplinary record, employee's physical and psychological fitness, personal characteristics and age. ELxouRi 391-409. Obviously, not allthese are relevant in every case.
41. Whether this is true in practice has been questioned. See SUCnTrm, HEALY &
LramENAsH, supra note 39, at 200.
42. N. CH~ianxm.AN & J. Kusus, CoLLEcInVm BARGANING 97 (2d ed. 1965);
BANDLE & WoumAN 505.
43. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81, 82 (1965) (Wagner) (emphasis added.)
44. American Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856, 857 (1963) (DiLeone) (emphasis
added).
45. R. D. Werner Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 21, 22 (1965) (Kates) (emphasis added).
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of these clauses can be grouped in the "sufficient ability" category
since under each the senior employee need possess only the minimum
acceptable qualifications. Management may consider the senior's
ability only in relation to the job itself, and the capabilities of the
qualified senior bidder may not be compared with those of junior
bidders, even though the latter are better qualified for the position. 46
However, a definition of "capable" or "qualified" must be determined.
Some negotiators attempt to meet this problem by including a definition in the contract. Naturally, this definition may be worded so as to
make it easy or difficult for the senior to qualify. For example, one
agreement said "'qualifications' and 'qualified' . . . shall mean with
normal supervision, the factors necessary for the satisfactory performance of the work for which the employee is being considered."47 This
contract also provided for a period in which the senior bidder could
demonstrate his qualifications, and further said that he need have only
"the minimum basic qualifications" to be entitled to the demonstration
period. The total effect of these provisions was to define "qualified"
in a manner favorable to the senior employee and to provide a period
clearly intended to allow him to prove he was qualified. 48 All of these
provisions were still not enough to prevent a dispute, however, over
the meaning of "normal supervision." The arbitrator interpreted this
phrase to mean that the senior employee was entitled to some "orientation, indoctrination, and on-the-job experience to demonstrate" his
49

ability.

The following provision defines "qualified" in a manner which makes
it more difficult for the senior bidder to meet the required standard:
'Qualified' . . . shall be deemed to consist of ability to perform satisfactorily the required duties of the job and to meet standards of quantity and
quality without the need of further training. It is understood, however, that
the employee will receive the usual and normal explanations to perform the
work involved. 50

Notice first that this contract uses the word "explanations" instead
of "supervision." The apparent thinking was that "explanations" was
less ambiguous, and also that it clearly suggested a very brief instruc46. American Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856, 860 (1963) (DiLeone); Nicholson
File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46, 49 (1959) (Warns).
47. John Deere Chem. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 443, 444 (1963) (Coffey).
48. Trial period clauses are often ambiguous as to whether they entitle the employee
to the opportunity to show that he is qualified, or whether the trial period is for the
company to "make sure" he can perform the job satisfactorily after it has already
determined that he is qualified. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267
(1965) (Beatty), and Dewey-Portland Cement Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 165 (1964)
(Sembower), with R. D. WemerCo., 45 Lab. Arb. 21 (1965) (Kates), and SemlingMenke Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 523 (1966) (Graff).
49. John Deere Chem. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 443, 445 (1963) (Coffey).
50. Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116, 1119 (1966) (Gorsuch).
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tional period. This latter expectation proved to be correct upon arbitration; the word was interpreted as entitling the senior employee
only to a "clarification" or an "interpretation" of the job duties.5'
Secondly, this provision requires not only that the senior be able to
perform "satisfactorily," but also that he be able to meet "standards
of quantity and quality." Furthermore, this contract did not give the
senior employee the right to a trial or demonstration period in which
to demonstrate his competence.
The total effect of the provisions above was to impose a higher
standard for the term "qualified" than that established by arbitrators
when the contract does not define the term. For in these latter cases,
while it is necessary that the senior man have a "present capacity"
for the job, and not merely the ability to learn it,5 2 this does not mean
that he must be competent initially in all phases of the job.5 3 Many
times the arbitrator will grant the senior employee a trial or "breaking
in" period in which he may demonstrate his capabilities, even though
the contract does not provide for such trial.54 Many contracts expressly
provide for such a period, but even here the cases are clear that there
is no duty to "train" the senior employee. 5 It is important to bear in
mind that the meaning of "qualified" will vary with the nature of the
job involved, and in some instances initial competence in all phases
of performance might be reasonable. 56 Whether all the evidence
shows the senior employee to be capable is again largely a personal
judgment, but the problem is not as difficult as under the "relative
ability" clauses, for here the senior is being measured only against
the job, and there is no comparison of employees involved.
D. Hybrid Clauses
When negotiators are unable to agree on one of the more common
seniority provisions, they may select a "hybrid" clause, which normally will not indicate whether seniority or ability is the more
important factor.57 As one would expect, there is no uniformity in the
51. Id. at 1122.
52. Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46, 49 (1959) (Warns).
53. General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213, 217 (1959) (Thompson).
54. E.g., Perfect Circle Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 817 (1964) (Dworkin); Southwest Air
Motive Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 353 (1963) (Elliot); Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb.
46 (1959) (Warns).
55. E.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1191 (1963) (Sherman); Nicholson
File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46 (1959) (Warns).
56. See General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213, 218 (1959) (Thompson).
57. Examples of such clauses include: "[I]n all cases of . . . promotion . . . the
following factors . . . shall be considered: a. continuous service and ability to perform
the work, b. physical fitness." Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37 (1960) (McCoy).
"The definition of seniority shall include ability to perform the required work of the job
in a satisfactory manner ... " Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 270
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interpretation of hybrid provisions, 5a but the consensus is that this
type of clause requires a comparison of both seniority and ability
differences, with a marked advantage in either category determining
the issue.59 However, the ambiguity of hybrid clauses increases the
likelihood of arbitration, and the arbitrator may interpret the provision
as intending that one factor be determinative, although the parties
actually intended no such priority. For example, a typical hybrid
clause has been construed as intending that seniority be the primary
consideration, partly because it was mentioned first. 60 On the other
hand, there seems to be a tendency for arbitrators to interpret hybrid
clauses as sufficient ability clauses. 61 Therefore, it appears that parties
should not select a hybrid clause unless they are consciously doing
so as a compromise, realizing fully that, should arbitration be necessary, the decision could go either way.
E. Review of Managements Determination of Ability
Under all three modified seniority clauses, management retains the
right to make the initial determination of ability, with the union
possessing the right to challenge the selection through the grievance
procedure. Should the parties not resolve the disputes which arise,
the ultimate decision lies with the arbitrator. It is the responsibility
of the arbitrator, who is normally unfamiliar with the job requirements and the individuals involved, to decide chiefly on the basis of
subjective factors, under vague standards, whether management's determination was correct. The problem which arises is: what is the
quantum of proof necessary to upset managements decision and upon
whom does the burden of proof lie?
Two detailed studies have been made of this problem and the
findings in essence are as follows. Wayne E. Howard found two
dominant schools of thought: "that which would upset company
determination only if it had been proved to be arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory; and that which would demand proof on the part
of the company that the action they took was justifiable."62 After
analyzing cases espousing both views and finding "various shades of
opinion expressed by different arbitrators within the [two] general
(1965) (Beatty). "[T]he Company shall be free to fill the Vacancy by selection of
an employee . . . taking into account length of service insofar as the conditions of
the business and the abilities of the employees permit." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
47 Lab. Arb. 475,476 (1966) (Erbs).
58. Howard, supra note 23, at 123; Mitchem, Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements (pt. 2), 21 RocKy MT. L. Rnv. 293, 310 (1949).
59. Erzouni 386-87; Howard, supra note 23, at 123-24.
60. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 47 Lab. Asb. 475 (1966) (Erbs).
61. E.g., St. Marys Kraft Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 364, 366 (1963) (Duncan).
62. Howard, The Role of the Arbitrator in Determination of Ability, 12 Ann. J.
(n.s.) 14, 17 (1957).
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groups," he asks "whether they represent a basic difference in approach . . . or whether they are merely semantic differences which,
in fact, lead arbitrators to the same conclusions under similar circumstances."6 He concludes that there is a difference and that it
does not lie in the quantum of proof, but rather in on whom the
burden of proof rests. Those arbitrators in the first group start with
the basic presumption that management decided correctly in the first
instance, and place upon the union the burden of proving the company
wrong. The other group assumes that the senior candidate possesses
the requisite ability and requires the company to prove the contrary.01
Howard recommends that the company be forced to shoulder the
burden for three reasons. (1) "Since management took the initial
action in selecting a particular employee for a job vacancy, it is6
reasonable to expect that it should be able to justify its selection."
(2) "[I]t puts the burden of defending the determination of ability
on that party which can best improve the procedures for carrying out
the evaluation process."6 (3) It is in accord with the scope of the
.arbitrator's authority in interpreting other contractual provisions
where he can find a violation, even though there is no evidence the
action was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.6 7
Frank and Edna Elkouri approach the problem by grouping the
cases under the type of seniority provision involved. Where there is a
"relative ability" clause, their findings showed three basic approaches,
with the majority apparently using the "arbitrary" test which places
the burden on the challenging union. 6a A study of recent decisions
by this writer reveals it is fairly well-established under "relative
ability" clauses that the union will have to show the company's action
was arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. 69 In decisions involving
"sufficient ability" clauses, the Elkouris found that arbitrators "placed
the burden on the employer to show that the bypassed senior employee
is not competent . . . ,"0 While this is generally the case, 1 strong
recent support can be found for arguing that the "arbitrary" test
should also be applied here. 2 As for "hybrid clauses," here the em63. Id. at 22.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Er.oum 388-89.

69. E.g., American Sugar Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 91 (1966) (Ray); United Fuel Gas Co.,
45 Lab. Arb. 307 (1965) (Lugar); Roller Bit Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 939 (1963)

General Box Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 866 (1960) (Caraway).
Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 471, 475 (1962) (Autrey).

(Autrey);

But see Yuba Heat Transfer

70. Exxoul 389.

71. Atlas Processing Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 860, 863 (1966)
Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856, 861 (1963) (DiLeone).

(Oppenheim); American
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ployer must show why ability was weighted more heavily than
seniority. 3
The Elkouris conclude, however, that regardless of the clause
involved, in the final analysis:
[A]s a practical matter, whether or not the arbitrator speaks in terms of
burden of proof, in most cases when management's determination is
challenged both parties are expected to produce whatever evidence they can
in support of their respective contentions, and they ordinarily do so. The
arbitrator in turn considers all the evidence and decides whether management's determination should be upheld as being reasonably supported by the
by improper elements such as
evidence and as not having been influenced
74
arbitrariness, caprice, or discrimination.

IV. TEsTs IN TE "LAw" OF ARBIRATiON
A. Introduction
As has been discussed, a principal appeal of seniority is its objectivity. But in recognition of managements right to an efficient and
productive operation, most contracts temper seniority with consideration of the employee's abilities. In balancing seniority and ability,
management is permitted to consider a number of factors. Because
several of these factors are subjective, management desires some
objective, demonstrable evidence to support its claim that the senior
employee was not "relatively equal" or that he did not have "sufficient

ability" to perform the job. One such objective method of measuring
employee qualifications is the use of tests.
B. Right To Test
In light of the fact that unions fought for the use of seniority in
the name of objectivity, it is difficult to justify their resistance to
testing. Nevertheless, most of the controversies over testing which
have reached the arbitrators thus far have involved the company's
legal right to use tests in determining employees' ability.75 Notwithstanding a few early decisions which forbade the company's use of
tests because the contract did not provide for them,7 6 the arbitrators
72. Shenango Furnace Co., 46 Lab. AMb. 203 (1966) (Klein); R. D. Werner Co.,
45 Lab. Arb. 21 (1965) (Kates); Emhart Mfg. Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 946 (1964) (Turkus).
73. ErLoum 390. For recent examples of this approach, see Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 475 (1966) (Erbs); Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267
(1965) (Beatty).
74. ELKOum 391 (emphasis added). See, e.g. Glass' Containers Mfrs. Institute,
Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217 (1966) (Dworkin).
75. See Metzler & Kohrs, Tests and "The Requirements of the job," 20 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 103 (1965).
76. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 479 (1955) (Barnes).
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have overwhelmingly approved their use if certain requirements are
met. It seems remarkable, therefore, that unions have continued to
contest managements right to test without questioning the validity
or administration of the tests.77 However, in more recent cases, the
union briefly argues the right-to-test issue, but concentrates its attack
on the company's alleged failure to meet the requirements arbitrators
have established to protect against testing abuses.
Even though the right to test is now established, it is well to be
aware of the arguments, al closely related to each other, presented by
unions against testing. The most important is that testing for promotions involves a "condition of employment" and therefore must be the
subject of prior negotiations.78 Virtually the same argument, but
somewhat different, is that promotion without testing through long
practice has become a "working condition" or a right, much like a
coffee break, which the company cannot change unilaterally.70 Another contention often heard is that the subject of testing was not
mentioned during negotiations" and, furthermore, the contract does
not authorize their use."' Finally, the argument is presented that the
proviuse of test results is to add another condition to the seniority
83
sions,82 or to substitute them for the qualifications listed.
Management advances many persuasive reasons justifying the use
of tests. For example, it is often argued that promotion clauses give
management the right to determine employee qualifications,8 and
this necessarily contemplates the use of reasonable means and a variety
of methods, including tests. 85 It can be argued that the company not
only has the right, but the obligation, to use tests under clauses requiring consideration of ability. 86 Another provision of the agreement
relied upon is the management prerogatives clause which reserves to
management all rights not contracted away. 87 The rebuttal to the
argument that tests are not provided for in the contract is that neither
are they forbidden.88 A past practice of promotion without testing
77. Capital Mfg. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1003, 1005 (1965) (Gibson); Perfect Circle
Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 817,819 (1964) (Dworkin).
78. Armstrong Cork Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 349, 351 (1964) (Handsaker).
79. Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37,38 (1960) (McCoy).
80. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81, 83 (1965) (Wagner); Capital Mfg. Co.,
45 Lab. Arb. 1003, 1005 (1965) (Gibson).
81. Perfect Circle Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 817, 819 (1964) (Dworkin).
82. Mead Containers, Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 349 (1960) (Dworkin).
83. Perfect Circle Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 817, 819 (1964) (Dworkin).
84. Capital Mfg. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1003, 1005 (1965) (Gibson); Mead Containers,
Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 349, 351-52 (1960) (Dworkin).
85. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965) (Beatty); Pretty Prods.,
Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 779, 783 (1964) (Nichols); Armstrong Cork Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 349,
350 (1964) (Handsaker).
86. See Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 951, 952 (1959) (McCoy).
87. Capital Mfg. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1003, 1006 (1965) (Gibson).
88. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965) (Beatty).
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will not be controlling, even if the company has always voluntarily
trained the senior employee on the job. 89 On the other hand, past
use of tests without objection is very damaging to the union's posi-

tion, particularly if subsequent contracts have not forbidden their

use.90 Wide usage of such tests in industry9' and the soundness of
testing in general 92 have also influenced the arbitrators. Arbitrators
have recognized that today's shortage of skilled labor, forcing man-

agement to train its employees, has increased the desirability of

using tests to determine which men have the required aptitude. 93 The
need for a prior determination of ability by testing is even more

obvious if the job involves possible danger to the public. 94 Finally,
just as seniority is objective, so are tests. 95

This last reason is undoubtedly one of the more, if not the most,
important reasons why testing has been readily accepted. For in the

words of Arbitrator Harry J. Dworkin:
The results of the tests frequently serve as a diagnostic aid and have value
in arriving at a reasonable, scientific and dispassionate conclusion of the fact
in issue. The use of testing procedures frequently provide [sic] a basis for
making a selection based upon a critical detachment as distinguished from
96
preference resulting from considerations unrelated to the job.

C. Arbitrators' Requirements in Evaluation of Tests
With the employer's right to test established, unions must question

the validity and administration of the tests if they hope to upset
management decisions. Through the years, various arbitrators have
formulated the basic requirements which the tests should meet in
rather indefinite terms. The essence of these ideas is contained in

the following, oft-quoted statement:
Arbitrators generally hold that tests used in determining ability must be
(1) specifically related to the requirements of the job, (2) fair and reasonable,
(3) administered in good faith and without discrimination, and (4) properly
97
evaluated.

It should be noted that these requirements are applicable to all types
89. John Strange Paper Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1184, 1187 (1965) (Larkin).
90. Perfect Circle Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 817, 822 (1964) (Dworkin); Caradco, Inc.,
35 Lab. Arb. 169, 174 (1960) (Graff).
91. Pretty Prods., Inc., 43 Lab: Arb. 779, 783 (1964) (Nichols).
92. Armstrong Cork Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 349 (1964) (Handsaker).
93. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81, 85 (1965) (Wagner).
94. Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) (Pigors) (driving trucks
on highways); Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley) (driving
trucks on highways).
95. Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217, 222 (1966) (Dworkin).
96. Id.
97. ELxoura 393.
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of tests-oral,98 written,99 or performance,1 00 and general aptitude
tests,' 0 ' or tests designed for certain types of jobs.0 2 There are two
additional requirements which are being imposed with increasing frequency: discussion of test results with the union; and a showing of
reasonable necessity for the tests.10 3 The following discussion sets each
of these six requirements in its current application.
1. Specifically Related to Job's Requirements.-This requirement

that the test be specifically related to the skill and knowledge required
on the job is the most litigious issue with respect to testing. Sometimes the issue is expressed as whether the test is reliable and valid,

meaning it must be consistent with requirements of the job and must

predict job performance with reasonable accuracy. 104 Arbitrators have

been criticized for applying this restriction only superficially, but this
is partially understandable since most arbitrators are lawyers, untrained in the science of testing. 05 This criticism appears justified in
light of the following approach: "This Board has no way of knowing
the accuracy and value of the test. It will have to assume that manage-

ment is not wasting its time giving useless tests."'0 Furthermore, the
fact that a test is widely used and accepted does not necessarily mean
it is appropriate for the job in issue, as where a general intelligence

test is used in filling the job of machine operator.'07 In other cases,
particularly where the tests are assigned to evaluate specific aptitudes,
wide usage may justify acceptance of their validity. 108
There are instances where it is fairly clear that the tests are not
sufficiently related. Thus it was held that a company could not disqualify a man on the basis of his performance on an aptitude and
98. Linde Air Prods. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 369, 370 (1955) (Shister).
99. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81, 87 (1965) (Wagner); Wisconsin Elee.
Power Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1401 (1961) (Davis).
100. Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) (Pigors) (drive truck);
General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213 (1959) (Thompson) (read instrument).
101. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81 (1965) (Wagner) (Wonderlic Personnel);
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1401 (1961) (Davis) (IQ).
102. Scott Paper Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 552 (1966) (Wolff) (mechanical comprehension);
Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217 (1966) (Dworkin) (maintenance adaptability).
103. However, it has been suggested that even the four more traditional requirements
receive only lip service from arbitrators in practice. Metzler & Kohrs, supra note 75,
at 104.
104. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. Arb. 92 (1964) (Brown); Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46 (1959) (Warns).
105. Metzler & Kohrs, supra note 75, at 104-05.
106. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965) (Beatty).
107. In one such case, the union argued to no avail that a mechanical aptitude
test should have been given. Armstrong Cork Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 349, 351 (1964)
(Handsaker).
108. E.g., Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81 (1965) (Wagner); Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 570 (1960) (Marshall).
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mechanical comprehension test when ninety per cent of the job's
duties consisted of clean-up workY°9 On the other hand, there can
be no question that a performance test involving the actual job duties
satisfies this first requirement. 10 In the great majority of cases where

it is unclear whether the test is valid, it would seem that arbitrators
could make a reasonably accurate determination merely by comparing
the questions with the job requirements.'
It is submitted that the employer faces a more difficult burden of
proof when the issue is whether the test predicts job performance
with reasonable accuracy, rather than whether it is specifically related
to the job. For under this stricter requirement, management may
have to introduce evidence that it has validated the tests by adminis2
tering them to employees presently performing the job satisfactorily."
In this respect, a study has revealed that while mechanical aptitude
tests can rule out definitely poor prospects, those scoring highest
may prove inferior to those in the average range." 3 This is due to
the tests' inability to evaluate motivation, attitudes, and imagination." 4 Also, tests may be clearly related to the job but held invalid
and unreliable if the
applicants involved are unable to read, write, or
5
verbalize fluently."
An obvious problem is how related the test must be. Must it be

tailor-made for a specific job in a particular company, or need it
only be reasonably related? Both views have been expressed. Several

arbitrators insist that the test be "tailored" to the job," 6 and one went

so far as to say "the sole question is whether a second electrician in

this plant could ...show his qualifications by his answers on this
109. Central Soya Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1027 (1963) (Tatum). See also Latrobe Steel
Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37, 38 (1960) (McCoy) (test designed for office clerks was administered to storeroom clerk applicants).
110. E.g., Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) (Pigors); Dayton
Steel Foundry Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley).
111. Caradco, Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 169 (1960) (Graff); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
33 Lab. Arb. 951 (1959) (McCoy).
112. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. ArKb. 92, 95 (1964) (Brown);
Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46, 48 (1959) (Warns).
113. Metzler &Kohrs, supranote 75, at 110.
114. A recent study at Williams College reflects much the same findings. It involved
the scores on college board Scholastic Aptitude Tests and showed that the student who
worked hard in high school and earned high grades, but scored relatively low on the
college board tests generally does better in college than the individual who did poorly
in high school but had high scores on his college boards. Education, Thmq, March 10,
1967, at 58. Both of these studies tend to show that motivation and work habits are
very important.
115. "[It is quite conceivable that the best bricklayer a company had could not
pass a written test on bricklaying." Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37, 39 (1960)
(McCoy).
116. Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116, 1123 (1966) (Gorsuch); Latrobe Steel Co.,
34 Lab. Arb. 37 (1960) (McCoy).
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test."1 7 A much broader position is reflected in the following statement: "It is generally agreed, however, that where ability to perform
the job in question is a matter to be judged in selection, any test that
has a reasonablerelation to the performance of the work to be done
may be used.""" If a company can afford the expense, satisfaction of
this requirement can be virtually assured by the hiring of an expert
in the area of industrial testing to visit the plant, conduct interviews,
observe the work and recommend established tests for the job." 9
A closely related problem is whether the test must relate only to
the skills necessary for the open position, or whether it may also
evaluate the applicant's potential for further advancement. It has
been said so often that the employer must determine employee
ability solely on the basis of the present job's requirements, without
regard to potential for subsequent upgrading, that perhaps this should
be listed as a separate rule.120 The reasons behind this statement are
sound, since such a rule does not limit the opportunity of a worker
to advance as far as his capabilities permit. Furthermore, ability with
respect to one particular job can be more accurately measured than
ability for possible future jobs.' 2 ' Nevertheless, there are decisions
which appear to indicate that if management can show that the position is a "helper" position and that the employee must spend part
of his time on the higher job,'2 or must be able to advance to higher
positions because of the job structure in the department,'23 then it may
be permissible to establish somewhat higher standards for the low
position. The reasoning behind this approach is also understandable.
If a certain "assistant" position teaches skills which are absolute prerequisites for the next higher job, and if the "assistant" job becomes
filled with men incapable of advancing further, the company has no
economical way to train men for the higher position.
117. Nicholson File Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 46, 48 (1959) (Warns) (emphasis added).
118. John Strange Paper Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1184, 1188 (1965) (Larkin) (emphasis
added).
119. See R. D. Werner Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 21 (1965) (Kates). See also Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217 (1966) (Dworkin); Dayton Steel
Foundry Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley). The use of company-devised tests,
such as that used in Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116 (1966) (Gorsuch), will probably
decrease sharply. See text accompanying notes 160 & 161 infra.
120. E.g., Georgia Kraft Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 829, 830 (1966) (Williams); Martin Co.,
46 Lab. Arb. 1116, 1123 (1966) (Gorsuch); Central Soya Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1027, 1031
(1963) (Tatum); Yuba Heat Transfer Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 471, 475 (1962) (Autrey).
121. See Howard, The Interpretation of Ability by Labor-Management Arbitrators,
14 AnB. J. (n.s.) 117, 131 (1959).
122. See Scott Paper Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 552 (1966) (Wolff).
123. See Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. ArKb. 217, 223 (1966)
(Dworkin). See also Pretty Prods., Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 779, 781-82 (1964) (Nichols),
where the company argued that the helper would, as soon as possible, be upgraded.
The company's selection was upheld and the arbitrator did not reject the appropriateness
of this argument.
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Finally, it must be remembered that the testing requirements are
in the conjunctive. It is possible, therefore, that the test may be valid
and sufficiently related in every respect, but that the arbitrator may
hold the applicant's failure should not disqualify him because the
test was not necessary in the first place. This situation arises most
frequently with respect to performance tests where the skill involved
can be learned in a short period of time.'2
2. Fairand Reasonable.-This rather general requirement is usually
concerned with whether the applicants were given sufficient time on
the test and understood the questions and instructions.'l 5 While there
is normally no dispute over whether the questions were fair, the
company can assure that there will be none by permitting the union
to eliminate any questions which appear unreasonable. 26 And a test
may be ruled unfair if the applicant's apparent lack of knowledge is
found to stem from an inability to read or to express himself. 12
3. Administered in Good Faith and Without Discrimination.-Itis
apparent there is some overlap among the six requirements, particularly between this and the "fair and reasonable" requirement discussed
in the preceding paragraph. Under this requirement, however, most
arbitrators are concerned with whether all the applicants were administered the same test under similar conditions.m In order to comply,
management should announce the test when the job is first posted,
and later should notify the unsuccessful applicants in time for them
to file grievances. 1' The company can be confident it has satisfied
this condition if a non-employee, unfamiliar with the applicants, administers and scores the tests.13 0 Further, the company may have
trained personnel administer the tests and permit the applicants to
take them twice. 13 '
Discrimination against a Negro applicant was found where the
administrator of a performance test had previously made a remark
showing racial prejudice. This statement, plus others during the test,
made the Negro nervous and resulted in his being given a seconf
test in the presence of a union representative. 32 A test devised and'
124. General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213 (1959) (Thompson); Acme-Newport
Steel Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 1002 (1959) (Schmidt).
125. See Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley); Linde.
Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 757 (1958) (Shister).
126. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 902 (1963) (Stein).
127. See Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37, 39 (1960) (McCoy); Linde Air Prods.
Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 369, 372 (1955) (Shister).
128. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965) (Beatty); Linde Co.,
21 Lab. Arb. 757 (1958) (Shister).
129. Caradco, Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 169, 174 (1960) (Graff).
130. Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 63 (1962) (Bradley).
131. Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217, 222 (1966) (Dworkin).
132. Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) (Pigors).
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given after the promotion will be held in bad faith because of the
possibility of its being slanted. 1 3 It is probable that if all the applicants had advance access to the test questions, with the consequent
opportunity to secure outside assistance, the arbitrator would rule
the test results inadmissable. Such was not the case, however, in a
very questionable decision where the arbitrator merely remarked:
In answer to the Union's charge, or implication, that two of the contestants
may have gotten outside help in answering the questions, as the Company

has pointed out, there was no great secret about the test questions. All
contestants bad the same opportunity; none finished the test at the first
session, but each of them
must have known what it was all about after
134
having his first session.

4. Properly Evaluated.-An obvious example of this requirement is
that the company cannot compare employees' scores under a "sufficient
ability" clause. Should the senior applicant achieve the minimum
acceptable mark, he is qualified with respect to the test factor. The
most troublesome problem arising under this requirement is the
validity of the cut-off score. It is on this issue and that of the test's
reliability and relation to the job's requirements'35 that unions will
henceforth pitch most of their cases.tm
Commentators have warned that even if a valid test has been
selected and is administered to two individuals equal in whatever is
being measured, there are factors which can cause differences in
their scores, such as: (a) ability to verbalize, (b) ability to read and
understand quickly, (c) experience in taking tests, (d) emotional and
physical conditions of the individuals, (e) errors in scoring, and
137
(f) appreciation of the importance of the test and degree of effort.
Furthermore, a score should not be considered as a specific point on
a scale, but rather as a mid-point on a range. To illustrate, on a
particular test, a score of 92 might properly be seen as representing a
range of scores between 86 and 98; a score of 82, a range between
76 and 88. The two bands overlap, indicating there is no marked
difference in the employees' knowledge.tm
In light of these facts, it is apparent that cut-off scores should not
only be established with great care but should also be used with
flexibility. A recent case involving an established minimum acceptable
score illustrates that both problems arise most frequently under
133. International Nickel Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 343 (1960) (Teple).
134. John Strange Paper Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1184, 1188 (1965) (Larkin).
135. See text accompanying notes 104-24 supra.
136. See BNA, 63 LAB. RtEL. REP. 70 (1966). See also National Cooperative
Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. Arb. 92 (1964) (Brown).
137. Metzler & Kohrs, Tests and "A Marked Difference in Ability," 19 Ann. J. (n.s.)

229, 233 (1964).

138. Id. at 234-35.
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"sufficient ability" clauses. 139 The cut-off scores for three tests were
based on the fact that seventy per cent of all candidates for apprentice
training achieved the minimum established score. The tests this time
were used for the higher position of Process Inspector. The obvious
question is whether these tests can be specifically related to both jobs.
Furthermore, while these cut-off scores appear fair, one can raise the
question whether experience had shown they did in fact exclude only
candidates who lacked the required qualifications. 140 Even more doubt
is cast upon the arbitrator's decision to uphold the company in light
of the fact that the grievant exceeded the cut-off score on two tests
and missed it by only one point on the third. Had prior experience
shown that someone scoring 39 points as opposed to 38 possessed
knowledge and skill which should set him apart from the grievant? 141
In support of the arbitrator, it should be mentioned that the other
factors considered supported his decision. A reading of the opinion,
however, suggests that considerable weight was given to the applicants' performances on the tests.
Another recent decision illustrates even more graphically an arbi142
trator's relying unquestioningly on the validity of cut-off scores.
Here the company administered a test and established 70 as the passing grade. The senior employee scored 47, and the other applicant, 33.
Since neither passed, a second examination was given with 65 set
as the passing grade. This time the grievant made 53; the junior
employee, 68. The junior man received the job. There is no discussion
of the validity of either 70 or 65 as cut-off scores, nor is there any
explanation for the successful bidder's significant jump from 33 to
68 when the senior employee's scores remained relatively consistent.
To make the decision even more questionable, there is little, if any,
consideration of other factors bearing on their respective abilities.
The questions raised about these two cases are not intended to infer
that the arbitrators' ultimate decisions were incorrect, but only to
suggest that the difficult problems presented by cut-off scores are not
always fully appreciated and adequately examined.
A "rule heard so frequently it perhaps should receive separate
43 In
treatment is that test scores should not be deemed conclusive.
one sense, this is a recognition of the problems raised above, but it
is also a warning that test results are only one factor relevant in
determining ability. This rule is one which cannot be overemphasized,
for there is a great danger that test scores because of their relative
139. R. D. Werner Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 21 (1965) (Kates).
140. See National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. Arb. 92, 96 (1964) (Brown).
141. See Standard Oil Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 907, 910 (1958) (Warns).
142. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 902 (1963) (Stein).
143. E.g., Class Containers Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 217 (1966) (Dworkin);
Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37 (1960) (McCoy).
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objectivity and apparent preciseness may unduly influence the entire
evaluation process.'"
5. Union Involvement in Testing.-A requirement which is being
incorporated into the arbitrators' decisions with increasing frequency
is that management confer with the union following the tests. 145 It
seems reasonable that the company should show the union the tests,
explain why answers were wrong, discuss how the cut-off score was
established, illustrate the method of grading, and reveal the weight
given each part of the test. At least one arbitrator believes the company is obligated to discuss in advance with the union its intention
146
to give a test, what it will cover, and what will be a passing grade.
Another arbitrator feels the union should participate in the selection
of the tests. 47 Undoubtedly, unions will soon be entitled to all of
these rights under the contract, since the subject of testing is just
beginning to be a subject at the bargaining table. 4 8
6. Test Must Be Reasonably Necessary.-An alternative manner
of phrasing this rule is that the test may not be an unreasonable
requirement. Perhaps the best exposition of this testing safeguard
is the following statement:
The test must be reasonably necessary to determine the qualifications of
perform [sic] the specific job involved. Certainly this means [that] for most
jobs where the work is routine or a man learns the work as a helper [or

where he] is certified or [is] a journeyman, such a test would be improper
as it would not be essential to the determination of a man's qualifications. 149
A company would be well advised to be selective in its use of tests.
If the job requires only a strong back, a quick look at the applicant's
personnel record and a physical examination probably would be the
only reasonable requirements.5 0 Whenever the skills can be learned
quickly or easily, tests for that skill may be held unreasonable.' 5 '
Should the job, however, require that the employee be initially competent to prevent unreasonable expense 152 or to protect the public, 153 a
144. For two decisions where this may have been the case, see Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 902 (1963) (Stein); Linde Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 757 (1958) (Shister).
145. Equitable Gas Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 81 (1965) (Wagner); Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 570 (1960) (Marshall); Latrobe Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37 (1960)
(McCoy); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 713 (1959) (Kelliher).
146. Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116, 1123 (1966) (Gorsuch).
147. Acme-Newport Steel Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 1002, 1005 (1959) (Schmidt).
148. See BNA, 63 LAB. REL. REP. 70 (1966).
149. Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116, 1123 (1966) (Gorsuch). See also Latrobe
Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 37 (1960) (McCoy).
150. See Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 951, 952 (1959) (McCoy).
151. See General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213 (1959) (Thompson); Acme-Newport
Steel Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 1002 (1959) (Schmidt).
152. See General Controls Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 213, 218 (1959) (Thompson).
153. See Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) (Pigors).
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test would be permissible regardless of how readily the skill may be
acquired. A test will also be an unreasonable requirement when the
employee under a "sufficient ability" clause, has previously performed
satisfactorily the job in question.'m And finally, it is possible that an
employee's record may so clearly indicate his right to the promotion
that any testing of him would be unreasonable. 5
V.

TESTS AND TBE

1964 CIVIL

IGHTs

Acr

A. Introduction
Employers in the past have often used tests for discriminatory purposes. Particularly in the South, Negroes are often fully qualified to
perform the work but unable to pass a written test because of their
educational deficiencies. Title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act attempts
to eliminate certain types of discriminatory tests. 56 Under this act,
employers are still authorized to use tests to determine employee
qualifications for employment or promotions, but their use is subject
to the condition that the tests, their "administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'- 7
Very few cases have as yet reached the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission involving this testing provision of the act. Employers, therefore, seeking guidance in the search for sound testing
procedures appealed to the Commission, which in turn consulted a
panel of outstanding psychologists. Based on the paners recommendations, the Commission issued testing guidelines in September, 1966.158

In its introductory remarks, the Commission warned that if facts
indicate an employer has discriminated in the past on the basis of
race, the use of tests by him will be scrutinized carefully. Because
there have been so few reported decisions, the announced guidelines
merit rather detailed treatment.
B. Testing Guidelines and "Professionally Developed
Ability Tests"

The Commission advocates that the employer who wishes to ensure
equal opportunity to all applicants and employees use a total personnel
154. Avco Mfg. Corp., 34 Lab. Arb. 71 (1959) (Gill).
155. American Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856 (1963) (DiLeone). The employee, however, would be wise to take the test, and then if he does poorly on it, argue one of the
points this paper has discussed. In this respect, see Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab.
Arb. 267, 269 (1965) (Beatty); Mead Containers, Inc., 35 Lab. Arb. 349, 353 (1960)
(Dworkin).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
158. CCH EMPLoYMENT PRACercEs, II 16,904 (1966).
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assessment system. This system places special emphasis on the following matters.
1. Careful Job Analysis To Define Skill Requirements.-An employer
should not place unnecessarily restrictive requirements on jobs. For
example, there are many jobs which should not be limited to "high
school graduates only." The primary concern here is that the employer
determine the essential requirements of the job before selecting tests.
2. Special Efforts in Recruiting Minorities.-The Commission urges
employers to seek out minority group applicants and to hire and promote "qualifiable" applicants.
3. Screening and Interviewing Related to Job Requirements.After determining the essential requirements of a job, the employer
should have personnel sincerely committed to equal employment
opportunity do the screening and interviewing. The interviewers
should realize that minority group applicants usually appear less confident or less knowledgeable than they actually are.
4. Tests Selected on the Basis of Specific Job-Related Criteria.Tests should be only one component of the personnel assessment
system. Furthermore, there is the danger that tests designed for one
situation may be improperly used in another situation. While the
Commission will not recommend any particular tests, it adopts the
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals,
published by The American Psychological Association. This publication was prepared by recognized experts in the area to establish
standards and technical merits of evaluation procedures.
5. Comparison of Test Performance Versus Job Performance.-The
Commission urges that employers use job-related ability tests. Even
if this is done, employers must realize that the scores of employees
who have not enjoyed equal educational opportunities will not
accurately reflect their job potential. The ultimate standard should
therefore be performance on the job.
6. Retesting.-Employers are encouraged to allow "failure candidates" who avail themselves of more training or experience to retake
the required tests. Testing regulations should be liberally construed
to allow for retesting.
7. Tests Should Be Validated for Minorities.-The sample population used to establish "norms" should include members of minority
groups, to ensure that the test is free from inadvertent bias. Employers
presently using tests should check them to make sure that hidden
discrimination is not present.
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8. Objective Administration of Tests.-Because tests are only assessment tools, their value depends upon the skill of the administrator.
It is essential that these persons be trained not only in the technicalities of testing, but also in maintaining proper testing conditions. Members of minority groups are particularly nervous during tests, and the
administrator should be adept at alleviating as much of the anxiety
as possible.
The Civil Rights Act places an additional limitation on company
testing programs since it permits only a "professionally developed
ability test." This has been defined by the Commission to mean
a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the partic-

ular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords
the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a
particular job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an
individual or organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not,
without more, justify its use within the meaning of Title VII. 599

A recent Commission decision announced that this provision means
"not only must the tests in question be devised by a person or firm in
the business or profession of developing employment tests, but in
addition, the tests must be developed and applied in accordance with
the accepted standards of the testing profession." 16 0 This requirement
would seem to eliminate completely the use of company-devised tests
except where the company employs an individual fully qualified in
the area of testing, or the company is confident no question of discrimination will arise.
This same decision also made it clear that the tests used must be
structured in terms of the skills required on the specific jobs in issue
and that the tests be validated accordingly. The Commission explained this to mean that it must be shown that those individuals
passing the test have a greater chance for success on the jobs involved
than those who fail. It will be noticed that this requirement is the
more stringent of the two commonly used by arbitrators. As was
discussed above,'161 some arbitrators require only that the test be
specifically related to the job, without discussing its accuracy in predicting job performance. Also illustrated by this Commission decision
is the danger of using "general intelligence" tests for promotional
purposes. The Commission held this type of test did not measure the
traits necessary for the successful performance of the available positions, here, laboring jobs in a paper mill.
While the testing requirements of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are
applicable only in cases of alleged discrimination on any of the named
159. Id. at 7319.
160. CCH Ei LOYmENT PrtAcTicEs, ff 17,304.53 (1966).

161. See text accompanying notes 135-44 supra.
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bases, it is only reasonable to predict that unions will demand that
these conditions be adhered to in all testing situations. For example,
future collective bargaining agreements may well forbid the use of
"general intelligence" tests, except for a few selected positions, because most industrial jobs do not require verbal facility and mathematical proficiency. The Commission's decisions involving proper
testing procedures will undoubtedly influence arbitrators' awards.
VI. CONCLUSION

Many employers began testing in order to introduce more objectivity
into the largely subjective process of evaluating employees' abilities
under seniority provisions. Unions, which had fought for seniority
in the name of objectivity, surprisingly contested management's right
to test. After approximately ten years of waging a losing struggle
on this issue, unions have recently switched their attack to the companies' alleged failures in meeting the requirements arbitrators have
established to protect against testing abuses. The testing requirements
enunciated by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to eliminate certain types of discrimination
through tests will assuredly have application in the further development of sound, overall testing programs for all employees. While
at present very few contracts have provisions with respect to testing,
undoubtedly most future agreements will. 62 This development should

reduce the number of disputes, since requirements now imposed by
arbitrators will be written into bargaining agreements. While there
will still be disagreements over whether the tests were properly
evaluated, 16 controversies as to whether the tests are specifically
related to the job's requirements'" can, and should, be prevented at
the bargaining table. This note was intended to provide some guidance
for both management and unions in the hope that tests may be properly
utilized, because the objectivity they offer the selection process complements the traditional seniority system and will clearly contribute to
a reduction of disputes over promotions.
Aiumy L. COLEMAN, JiR.
162. See BNA, 63 LAm. REL. REP. 70 (196).
163. See text accompanying notes 135-44 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 104-24 supra.

